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The potential sensitivity of environmental resource valuation to payment vehicles is of interest to
researchers and decision-makers involved in estimating and applying these numbers. A conceptual
model is developed which provides insight into how the different payment vehicles of a special tax
and a tax reallocation affects the willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental goods.  Hypothesis
testing using contingent valuation data suggests WTP with a tax reallocation is higher than WTP
with a special tax for ground water quality protection in Georgia and Maine. 
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                         Introduction
Much progress has been made in the past two decades in the development of techniques
for measuring the economic value of environmental goods. One of the most commonly applied
techniques is the contingent valuation (CV) method (Cummings, Brookshire, and Schultz, 1986;
Mitchell and Carson, 1989).  Previous research has shown that CV results are sensitive to
payment vehicles; for example, taxes, entrance fees and utility bills (Rowe, d’Arge, and,
Brookshire,1980; Greenley, Walsh and Young,1981; Brookshire, Randall, and Stoll,1980 ). The
NOAA blue-ribbon CV panel recommended that the valuation question should be posed as a vote
on a referendum (Arrow et al., 1993).  In such cases, a special tax is a typical payment vehicle and
has been used in many previous CV surveys.  There are a number of examples of real-world
special taxes which are used to finance public goods.  One example is special local option sales
taxes which must be approved by local voters.  The revenues from these special sales taxes are
used to finance public projects such as roads, schools, and water and sewer infrastructure.
In many cases, new public goods may be financed by a tax reallocation rather than by new
taxes.  For example, suppose a state or local government wants to increase expenditures on new
police officers and equipment.  Rather than increasing taxes, the new police officers and
equipment may be financed by reducing expenditures on other public goods such as new roads
and schools. To our knowledge, tax reallocations have not been used as a payment vehicle in
previous CV surveys.  The primary purpose of this paper is to examine conceptually and
empirically the question of whether or not people prefer financing provision of environmental
goods with new taxes or tax reallocations using a ground water quality case study.5
In recent years, ground water quality has received increased attention as results of studies
documenting threats to ground water quality.  A number of previous studies have applied
contingent valuation to value ground water quality protection or remediation (Bergstrom et al,
2001; Edwards,1985; Hanley,1989; Jordan and Elnagheeb,1993; Shultz and Lindsay,1990; Sun,
Bergstrom, and Dorfman,1992).  These studies employed different types of payment vehicles
including property taxes, bonds, water bills, and generic total annual costs  to households.
  Generally, payment vehicles used in previous CV studies can be classified into two broad
categories. One is measured by direct income changes where the total payment cannot be adjusted
by a household because the total payment is fixed regardless of the amount consumed.  Property
taxes and hunting licenses are examples of this type of payment vehicle. The other broad category
is measured by commodity price changes where the total payment can be adjusted by a household
through the amount of the commodity consumed.  Water bills and entrance fees are included in
this category.  A third and unique type of payment vehicle examined in this paper is a tax
reallocation that neither changes an individual’s income or the price of an environmental good.  A
tax reallocation may lead to a different theoretical welfare measure constructs as compared to
payment vehicles used in previous environmental good valuation studies as illustrated in the next
section.  
Conceptual Model 
The tax reallocation payment vehicle reallocates fixed tax expenditures to finance 
environmental goods, thereby reducing the amount of a household’s tax money which can be
spent on other public goods.  Consider a household with a utility function and utility maximization
problem as follows:6
                 Maximize    u = u(X,Q,Z)       subject to   M = PX  + Z
                            
 X
where u is a direct utility function; X is a vector of market goods (X = x1,￿ ,xi,￿ ,xn); P is a price
vector of market goods; Q is ground water quality, Z is a composite commodity of all other public
goods (omitting a ground water quality protection program) with unit price and its value equals a
tax charged to a household, and M is a nominal income.  Hence, M-Z dented by Md is a
household’s disposable income which is spent on market goods purchases PX . We assume that
utility is positively related to X, Q, and Z. This yields a set of conditional demand functions for the
market goods xi *(P, Q, Z,Md).  Inserting xi * into the direct utility function gives the conditional
indirect utility function:
(1) u = v(P,Q,Z,Md).  
Inverting the conditional indirect function for the disposable income Md  yields a conditional
expenditure function,
(2) e* = Md  = e*(P,Q,Z,u) . 
Equation (2) defines the minimum expenditures on private goods required to produce utility level
u  given P, Q and Z.
The dual to the utility maximization problem can be stated as follows: minimize total
expenditures subject to the constraint that utility equals or exceeds some stated level u. The
solution to this problem gives the restricted expenditure function:
(3) e = e(P,Q,Z,u),
which defines the total expenditures on both private and public goods necessary to achieve u
given P, Q, and Z. The conditional and restricted expenditure function are related by the following
expression:7
(4) e = e(P,Q,Z,u) = e*(P,Q,Z,u) + Z
where e(C) and e*(C) are equal to nominal and disposable income, respectively. 
Welfare Measures for a Special Tax
Assume that without a ground water quality protection program, ground water quality will
be Q





the supply of other public goods at Z
0.  When nominal income does not change, willingness to pay
(WTP) for ground water quality improvement is given by compensating surplus (CS) defined
using (3) and (4) as:



























0 )  is the utility level at which the delegated water quality is Q
0 without
the protection program with Md
0 = M - Z
o.
CS  is illustrated in Figure 1.  The initial position is at point A, where the household has
disposable income Md
0 and consumes Z
0, X
0 , Q
0 ahieving utility level u
0 .  The ground water
protection program (protection of degradation) shifts Q from Q
0 to Q
1.  CS for this change
holding Z constant at Z
0 is defined by Md
0 - Md
1 in the Q,Md plane in Figure 1. 
Welfare Measures Definition for a Tax Reallocation
Assume again that a protection program will improve ground water quality from Q
0 to
Q
1 .  A tax reallocation payment vehicle would require a household to tradeoff some amount of all
other public goods (Z) to obtain the improvement in Q.  The tradeoff that an individual is willing
to make holding disposable income constant at  Md
0  is shown by Z
o-Z
1 in the Q,Z plane in Figure8





1.   This welfare measure which we call  compensating tax reallocation (CTR) is defined as:






















Using (4), we can rewrite (6) as:









Equation (7) implies that (8) reduces to:
(9) CTR = Z
0 - Z
1.









implying that the equation for CTR can also be written as:







Welfare Measure Comparison between Special Tax and Tax Reallocation 
In the case of CS defined by (5), P, Z and u are held constant, meaning that the total
differential of the indirect utility function (1) is:























Equation (13) shows that CS corresponding to (5) for an incremental change in Q is equal to the
marginal rate of substitution between groundwater quality and disposable income.
In the case of CTR, disposable income is held constant.  With P, Md , and u held constant,
the total differential of (1) is:
Equation (15) implies that,
Equation (15) implies that CTR corresponding to (8) for an incremental change in Q is equal to
the marginal rate of substitution between groundwater quality and all other public goods.
Equations (13) and (15) imply that the difference between CS and CTR (CS - CTR) for an
incremental change in Q is equal to the difference between MRSQ,Md  and MRSQ,Z.  Thus, 10
































According to (16),  if MRSQ,Md > MRSQ,Z, then CS > CTR; if  MRSQ,Md < MRSQ,Z then CS < CTR;
and if  MRSQ,Md = MRSQ,Z, then CS = CTR.
Using (5) and (8), the derivative of (2) with respect to Z and the total differential of (1)
given P, Q and U are unchanged, the difference between CS and CTR can also be stated as:
 Both (16) and (17) imply that,
The results shown in (13)-(18) have the following intuitive interpretation.  We expect CS to be
greater than CTR  if an individual prefers an increase in all other public goods Z to an increase in
disposable income, or if he or she prefers an increase in a dollar’s worth of public goods other
than ground water quality to an increase in a dollar’s worth of private goods.  As an analogy, if11
(20) MZ 1/MQ 1 ’ &Mv/MQ 1.
we prefer gold to silver, our willingness-to-pay for the same unit of private goods will be less if
we purchase the unit with gold rather than silver.  
We expect CTR to be greater than CS if an individual prefers an increase in disposable
income to an increase in all other public goods Z, or if he or she prefers an increase in a dollar’s
worth of private goods to a dollar’s worth of public goods other than ground water quality.  CS
equals CTR if an individual is indifferent between an increase (or decrease) in private goods and
all other public goods, or if he or she is indifferent between an increase (or decrease) in a dollar’s
worth of public goods other than ground water quality and a dollar’s worth of private goods. 
Comparative Statics for CTR
Previous applied welfare economics literature (e.g., McConnell, 1990) indicates that WTP
for a good Q measured in terms of CS  is expected theoretically to be increasing in Q.  A positive
income effect is also expected if Q is a normal good as would be typical for environmental goods
such as water quality.  Does CTR share these properties?  Consider first the effects of changes in
Q on CTR.  When Q is increased from Q
0 to Q
1, and Z is adjusted to offset the change in Q so that
utility stays constant at the initial level, the following is implied:




0 ) = v(P,Q
1, Z
1,Md
0 ).                              
Taking the derivative of (19) with respect to Q
1 and rearranging gives:  
Assuming Q is an environmental good with a positive marginal utility, the sign of Mv/MQ
1 is
positive, implying in (20) that the of sign MZ
1/MQ
1 is negative. Therefore, using (11), the derivative
of CTR with respect to Q
1  gives 12

















































Thus, CTR is increasing in the environmental good Q.
Secondly, we examine the effect of nominal income M on CTR.  Taking the derivative of
(19) with respect to M and rearranging gives:
Given MCTR / MM = MZ
1 / MM and assuming Mv/MZ
1 is positive, (22) implies the following
relationship: 
Equation (23) states that the effect of nominal income M on CTR  is positive when the marginal
utility associated with a small increase of disposal income Md
0 at the initial Q and Z levels
(Q
0 and Z
0) is larger than the marginal utility at the subsequent (e.g, post-program) levels (Q
1 and
Z
1) , and vice versa.  In other words, the effect of M on CTR is positive if substitution of Q for
other public goods services Z decreases the marginal utility of disposable income Md
0, and vice
versa. The effect equals zero when the marginal utility of disposable income does not change
between the parameter sets (P,Q
0,Z
0,Md





A case study was conducted to test hypotheses for the difference between CS and CTR in
the case of ground water quality valuation.  For the case study, valuation data were collected in
Dougherty County, Georgia and Aroostook County, Maine. In Dougherty County, regardless of
private well or public water system resources, close to 100 % of people get their drinking water
from ground water supplies. Ground water quality monitoring by the Georgia Geologic Survey
indicates that at the time of the case study, about 98 % of public and private ground water
supplies in Dougherty County had nitrate levels which met the federal safety standard of 10
milligrams per liter (Davis, 1999; Stuart et al.,1995).  In Aroostook County 83 % of people get
their drinking water from underground water supplies. Ground water quality monitoring by the
Maine Department of Environment Protection indicates that at the time of the case study about 87
% of public and private ground water supplies in Aroostook County had nitrate levels which met
the federal safety standard of 10 milligrams per liter.
A contingent valuation survey was conducted to collect data on preferences and values for
ground water protection in both Georgia and Maine.  Background and more detail on the survey
are provided in Bergstrom et al., 2001.   The survey involved bid elicitation using mail
questionnaires with different payment vehicles: a special tax and tax reallocation.  This split-
sample design provided data for testing hypotheses about the effects of the special tax and tax
reallocation payment vehicles on ground water values.
Payment Vehicle Effects Hypothesis
The theoretical discussion in the previous section suggests that CS and CTR could be
different for ground water quality protection in Georgia and Maine.  As indicated by (16) and14
(18), the direction of the effect cannot be predicted a priori; therefore payment vehicle tests are
two-tailed.  In the case of open-ended (OE) bids, the hypothesis to be tested is stated formally as:
Hypothesis 1
           Ho
1 : WTPST = WTPTR                 H
 
a
1: WTPST ￿ WTPTR 
where WTPST   is willingness to pay measured using a special tax (CS) and WTPTR is willingness to
pay measured using a tax reallocation (CTR).  In words,  Hypothesis 1 states that different
payment vehicles do not affect ground water quality protection values using an OE question.  This
hypothesis can be tested using standard t-tests for the difference between two means.  In the case
of dichotomous-choice (DC) responses, the hypothesis to be tested is stated formally as:
Hypothesis 2
          Ho
2 : ARST = ARTR                      H
 
a
2: ARST ￿ ARTR 
where ARST  is the DC acceptance rate using the special tax and ARTR is the DC acceptance rate
using the tax reallocation.   In words, Hypothesis 2 states that the different payment vehicles do
not affect the acceptance rate for a ground water quality protection program using a DC question. 
Hypothesis 2 can be tested using the difference between DC acceptance rates across the split-
sample populations.
Survey Design and Procedures
The contingent valuation method was used to elicite a household’s WTP to protect ground
water quality from potential nitrate contamination.  The objectives of the survey were to; 1)
estimate willingness-to-pay (WTP) for a ground water quality protection program, 2) compare15
WTP estimates measured using two different payment vehicles, and 3) examine potential factors
affecting a household’s WTP.
Each questionnaire was divided into three sections. The first section asked questions about
a respondent’s residence, experiences and concerns with ground water quality and other public
issues.   The second section began by presenting information on ground water supplies, potential
contamination sources, and potential health effects of nitrate contamination, and questions to
assess background knowledge of these issues.  The valuation question for a proposed ground
water protection program used one of two payment vehicles: a special tax measuring CS and a tax
reallocation measuring CTR. The special tax needed to fund the program would reduce the
amount of money a respondent currently has to spend on other goods and services (see Appendix
A).  The tax reallocation would not reduce disposable income, but would reduce the amount of a
household’s tax money which can be spent on other public goods (see Appendix B).
The DC valuation question asked whether respondents would vote to support the ground
water quality protection program given a specified program cost in terms of a special tax or a tax
reallocation (Question 16 in Appendix A and B). In order to gain additional information,
respondents were also asked to state their maximum WTP for the program using an open-ended
(i.e., “fill-in-blank”) question (Question 17 in Appendix A and B). 
The survey was conducted from September, 1996 to March, 1997.  A total of 1050
households in Maine and 1049  households in Georgia were randomly selected from county
registered voter list  and telephone directories provided by a professional survey research firm.
The sample was first divided into two groups; the special tax group and tax reallocation group.
Each group was further divided into 8 subgroups, which were assigned to receive one of eight16
offer amounts for DC valuation question. The offer amounts were $25, $50, $75, $100, $150, 
$200, $350, and $500, respectively. These offer prices were based on meta-analysis of ground
water values from previous studies (Boyle, Poe, and Bergstrom,1994) and calculated to get a
distribution of WTP.  The questionnaires also contained an OE valuation question which followed
each DC question.  An initial questionnaire in Georgia was sent to all households in the sample.
One week later a reminder postcard was sent to all households again. Three weeks later, a first
follow-up cover letter and replacement questionnaire were sent to all non-respondents.  One
month later, a second  follow up cover letter and replacement questionnaire were sent to all
nonrespondents.  Parallel procedures were followed in Maine. A third cover letter and
replacement questionnaire were sent to the Georgia sample to help boost the response rate.
Hypothesis Tests about Mean Bids and Mean Acceptance Rate 
Of 1,049 surveys sent out in Georgia, 262 were bad addresses, leaving an adjusted sample
frame size of 787.  417 questionnaires were returned for a response rate of 53.0 %. Also of 1,050
surveys sent out in Maine,130 were bad addresses, leaving an adjusted sample frame size of 920. 
486 questionnaires were returned for an  response rate of 52.9 %.
Table 1 shows the results of test comparing mean OE bids for the special tax and for the
tax reallocation.   Mean OE bids for the special tax and the tax reallocation in Maine were $40.27
and $109.10 , respectively.  For Georgia, mean OE bids were $64.85 and $113.70 for the special
tax and tax reallocation, respectively.  Result of t-tests of difference in population means showed
t-values of 3.80 and 2.89 with significance at the 0.01 level.  These results suggest that hypothesis
Ho
1 is rejected in favor of the alternative,  Ha
1.17
(24) LWTP ’ â0 % â1TAX % â2INCOME % â3PROG % â4WTPROG % â5WATQLT
% â6AIRWLT % â7FILTER % â8STATE % â9GENDER
(25) P ’ [1 % exp(&K(.))]&1
K(.) ’ â0 % â1TAX % â2INCOME % â3PROG % â4WTPROG % â5WATQLT
% â6AIRQLT % â7FILTER % â8STATE % â9GENDER.
 Table 2 shows the results of testing for differences in DC acceptance rates between the
special tax and tax reallocation for two sets of populations using a standard normal distribution. 
Results show that acceptance rates for the tax reallocation in Georgia and Maine were higher than
those for the special tax at the 0.01 significance level.  These results suggest that hypothesis 
Ho
2 is rejected in favor of the alternative Ha
2.
OE Bid Function and DC Acceptance Rate Function Specification 
An empirical Tobit model for OE bids was specified as:
and an empirical Logit model for the DC question acceptance probability was specified as:
where 
Equations (24) and (25) were selected as pragmatic approximations because the true, utility
theoretic valuation model is unknown.  LWTP in (24) is the natural log of WTP to protect ground
water quality and P in (25) is the probability of a “Yes” response to the DC question. The
explanatory variables and their expected coefficient signs are as follows: LTAX is the natural log18
of offer price in the DC questions and â1 in (24) has an expected  negative sign.  Based on
previous studies of anchoring effects (Herriges and Shogren, 1996; Randall et al, 2001), we
expected that the OE bid would be influenced by the DC offer price in a positive manner implying
a positive sign for â1 in (24).
LINCOME is the natural log of household income reported in the survey.  Demand for
environmental quality is usually expected to increase with income; hence, it was expected that â2 
in (24) would have a positive sign. However, in the case of the tax reallocation, the effect of
nominal income could be either positive or negative. Thus, the sign of â2 in (25) could be either
positive or negative.  
PROG and WTPROG are subjective probabilities for ground water safety with and
without the protection program, respectively. The more (less) a person expects ground water to
be safe with the program, the more (less) he or she is to be willing to pay for the program,
respectively.  Thus, it was expected that â3 and â4 in (24) and (25) would have positive and
negative signs, respectively. WATQLT and AIRQLT are dummy variables for a priority on the
public agenda for protecting ground water quality and air quality, respectively (1 = very high
priority, 0 = otherwise). The more a person has a priority for protecting ground water quality and
air quality, the more he or she is likely to be willing to pay for ground water quality protection.
Thus, it was expected that â5 and â6 in (24) and (25) would have positive signs. FILTER is a
dummy variable for installing a water filter designed to remove harmful chemicals (1 = Yes, 0 =
No). If a person has installed a water filter, he or she would likely pay more for protecting ground
water quality in order to avoid additional costs associated with water filter maintenance. 
Therefore, â6 in (24) and (25) was expected to have a positive sign.  STATE is a dummy variable 19
indicating a respondent’s state of residence (1= Maine, 0 = Georgia), and GENDER indicates a
respondent’s gender (1 = male, 0 = female). Conceptually, the effect of a person's residence and
gender on preferences for environmental quality is rather ambiguous.  Thus, â8 and â9 in (17) and
(25) were hypothesized to have either positive or negative signs. 
Estimation and Hypothesis Test Results
Equations (24) and (25) were estimated using a pooled Maine and Georgia data set.  Tobit
estimates of (24) and Maximum likelihood estimates of (25) are  shown in Table 3. Tobit and
Logit models for the special tax case are designated Model 1 and Model 2, respectively.  The
coefficients on LTAX, LINCOME, PROG and WTPROG were statistically significant.  LTAX had
an expected positive sign in Model 1 and an expected negative sign in Model 2, LINCOME and
PROG had expected positive signs and WTPROG had an expected negative sign in both models. 
WATQLT, AIRQLT and FILTER had expected positive signs but only WTPROG in the Logit
model was statistically significant.  STATE and GENDER were not statistically significant.  
In Table 3, Tobit and Logit models for the tax reallocation case are designated Model 3
and Model 4, respectively.  The coefficients for LTAX were statistically significant and had an
expected positive sign in Model 3 and an expected negative sign in Model 4.  The coefficients for
LINCOME in both models were not statistically significant.      
The coefficient for PROG and WTPROG were statistically significant, and had an
expected positive and an expected negative sign in both models, respectively.  WATQLT, AIRQLT
and FILTER had expected positive signs and were statistically significant in Model 4.  WATQLT
in Model 3 was not statistically significant.  STATE and GENDER were not statistically significant
in Model 3 and Model 4.  20
The mean bids for ground water quality protection estimated from the Tobit models for
the OE data were $69.04 for the special tax and $130.40 for the tax reallocation. This difference
was statistically significant at the 0.01 level indicating rejection of Ho
1 in favor of the alternative, 
Ha
1.   In the DC case, using the Cameron (1988) estimation approach, mean WTP for ground
water quality protection was estimated at $47.81 for the special tax and $851.40 for the tax
reallocation.  Thus, estimated mean WTP using the tax reallocation was about 18 times higher as
compared to WTP using the special tax giving support to rejection of Ho
2 in favor of the
alternative, Ha
2.    
Conclusions
The empirical results of this study indicate that people in our sample were willing to pay
more for ground water quality protection using a tax reallocation financing mechanism as
compared to a special tax financing mechanism.  This result, following our theoretical model,
suggest that the marginal utility of disposable income is larger than that marginal utility of other
public good services Z.  Thus, individuals in our sample, on average, appear to prefer an increase
of disposable income over an increase in public good services other than ground water quality
protection.  These preferences may be reasonable from the perspective of an economically rational
individual because public good use is typically more restrictive than private good use.   
In addition to eliciting higher values, our results suggest that welfare effects measured by a
tax reallocation may not be influenced by nominal income.  This result may be desirable from a
social justice perspective since the evaluated amount does not depend on a person’s nominal
income.  This income-neutral effect may be important, for example, if environmental good
valuation results were to be applied in a cost benefit analysis with both positive and negative21
welfare effects; for example, such as when the benefits of a policy or project go primarily to high
income people and the costs fall primarily on low income people.
Tax reallocations provide an alternative means for financing environmental goods and for
eliciting welfare measures for changes in environmental goods.  The conceptual model provided in
this paper specifies conditions under which tax reallocation welfare measures will be equivalent to
welfare measures using more traditional public good financing mechanisms and payment vehicles
such as a special tax.   These conditions were not met in our empirical case study where tax
reallocations resulted in significantly higher values for a particular environmental good, ground
water quality.  Thus, welfare analysis using environmental good values measured using tax
reallocations should proceed with caution.  Because tax reallocations may be more neutral from
political and income distribution perspectives, we encourage further conceptual and empirical
research to establish the validity of this unique public good financing and environmental good
valuation approach.  22
Appendix A.
The costs of the program would have to be paid by you and other citizens.  The program will be
founded by a special tax.  Thus, paying for the program would reduce the amount of money you
have to spend on the other goods and services.  If it is approved by voters, the program, including
the special tax, will be effect for 10 years only.
Q16. If the program of providing technical and financial assistance to individuals and groups
interesting in protecting ground water from potential nitrate contamination were placed on the
next ballot, would you vote for the program if the special tax needed to found the program cost
your household $100 per year for 10 years ? (Circle one number)  
     1. Yes - I would vote in favor of the program.
     2. No - I would vote against the program.
Q17.  If you vote Yes to Question 16, perhaps you would also vote the program at a higher cost. 
If you vote No to Question 16, perhaps the program would have to cost you nothing ($0) before
you would vote for it.  What is the highest amount of money the special tax needed to fund the
program could cost your household per year for 10 years before you would vote against it.  Please
write this amount in the space below.  (Please fill the blank)
I would vote in favor of the program if the maximum  the special tax cost my household was $     
per year for 10 years.23
Appendix B.
The cost of program would have to be paid by you and other citizens.  The program will not
increase your taxes.  Payments for the program will be in the form of a reallocation of your tax
dollars from other public services ( for example, reallocation of tax dollars from spending on
roads and bridges, school, park, police protection, health care, etc.).  Thus, paying for the
program would reduce the amount of other public services which are currently available.  If it is
approved by voters, the program, including the tax reallocation plan, will be in effect for 10 years
only. 
Q16.  If the program of providing technical and financial assistance to individuals and groups
interesting in protecting ground water from potential nitrate contamination were placed on the
next ballot, would you vote for the program if reduced the amount of your household's tax money
which spent on the other public services by $100 per year ? (Circle one number) 
1. Yes - I would vote in favor of the program.
2. No - I would vote against the program.
Q17.  If you vote Yes to Question 16, perhaps you would also vote the program at a higher cost. 
If you vote No to Question 16, perhaps the program would have to cost you nothing ($0) before
you would vote for it.  What is the highest amount of money that could be reallocated from your
household's tax dollars for other public services  before you would vote against it.  Please write
this amount in the space below.  (Please fill the blank)
I would vote in favor of the program if the maximum reallocation of my household's tax dollars
from other services was $     per year.24
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Figure 1.  Illustration of CS and CTR for an Environmental Good Increment
CS27
Table 1.   Comparison in Mean OE Bid between Special Tax and Tax Reallocation
              Special Tax        Tax Reallocation
   T-Value
Mean  (S.D.) N Mean  (S.D.) N
Maine
Georgia
40.27 (79.73) 208 109.1 (244.5) 154
 
3.798***
64.85 (124.8) 166 113.7 (167.8) 133
 
2.885***
1) *** indicates significance at the 0.01 levels. 
Table 2.    Comparison in Mean Acceptance Rate between Special Tax and Tax Reallocation
        Special Tax  Tax Reallocation  
   T-Value
 Mean   (S.D.) N  Mean   (S.D.) N
Maine
Georgia
0.2544 (0.4556) 228 0.6443 (0.4871) 209
 
 5.530***
0.4162 (0.4941) 197 0.7667 (0.4241) 180
  
6.692***
1) *** indicates significance at the 0.01 levels. 28
       Table 3.      Comparison of Estimates between Specia1 Tax and Tax Reallocation
Variable
               Special Tax                      Tax Reallocation 

















































































N 236 258 210 232
AIC 9.552 1.062 10.20 1.016
R-Squared 0.321 0.329
Mean ($) 69.04 47.81 130.4 851.4
1) Numbers in parentheses are t- statistic.
2)***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
3)AIC is Akaike Information Criteria and calculated by -2logL/n + 2k/n , where L is log of likelihood,
 k is a number of parameters, and n is a sample size. 